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In 1974 employee benefit plans1 in the United States provided re-
tirement and other benefits to almost half of the nonagricultural work
force in the private sector and had accumulated an estimated $175
billion in assets, 2 one of the largest accumulations of investment capital
in our economy. The need for more effective control of pension plan
fiduciaries was one of the reasons Congress enacted the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).3 Among the fiduciary
provisions of the Act are "Prohibited Transactions Rules" (Rules) that
proscribe certain classes of transactions where there exists a significant
potential for fiduciary abuse. 4 Because many transactions fall within
the Rules yet offer no opportunity for insider misconduct and, indeed,
1. As used in this Note, the terms "employee benefit plan," "pension plan," or "plan"
will refer to the definition of "employee benefit plan" contained in the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). An "employee benefit plan" means either an
employee welfare benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan. ERISA § 3(3), 29
U.S.C. § 1002(3) (Supp. V 1975). The former encompasses any plan providing medical,
surgical, and hospital benefits, payment in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death,
or unemployment, and even plans providing vacation pay, apprenticeship programs or
scholarship funds, and day care and prepaid legal services. Id. § 3(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)
(Supp. V 1975). The latter includes plans providing retirement income and deferred com-
pensation to employees. Id. § 3(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2) (Supp. V 1975).
2. D. McGILL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 29 (1975); see S. REP. No. 127, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4839-40 (in 1973,
30 million workers or over half industrial work force in United States covered by private
pension plans) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT, with page citation to [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws].
3. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified principally at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381
(Supp. V 1975) and in scattered sections of the Internal Revenue Code). The Act's legisla-
tive history is contained in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEvs 4639-5190. For an overview
of ERISA, see Comment, The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: Policies
and Problems, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 539 (1975). A more detailed discussion of the Act's
section entitled "Fiduciary Responsibility" is articulated in Note, Fiduciary Standards
Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 63 GEo. L.J. 1109 (1975).
4. ERISA §§ 406, 407(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1106, 1107(a) (Supp. V 1975). The Prohibited
Transactions Rules impose three types of proscriptions upon plan fiduciaries: (a) a fidu-
ciary shall not cause the plan to engage in a transaction, such as a sale of property, exten-
sion of credit, or furnishing of services, with a party-in-interest; (b) a fiduciary shall not
deal with plan assets for his own account or act contrary to interests of the plan; and (c) a
fiduciary shall not allow the plan to purchase or hold employer real property or securities
if such holdings constitute more than 10% of the plan's assets. See pp. 766-67 & notes
34-37 infra.
The tax provisions of ERISA (Title II) contain similar proscriptions. ERISA § 2003(a),
I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1). This Note, however, will deal primarily with the labor provisions of
the Act (Title I).
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confer benefits upon plan participants, 5 the Act provides for administra-
tive variances and other exemptions from the absolute proscriptions of
the Rules."
This Note both argues that the administrative variances have not
worked effectively and proposes certain reforms. It first analyzes the
Rules in light of the background of ERISA, the Act's fiduciary re-
sponsibility provisions, and the specific costs of the Rules. The Note
then examines the administrative variances and finds them inadequate
because of lengthy procedures and an overprotective, complex stan-
dard. Finally, the Note proposes that Congress mandate a streamlined
agency procedure and an "objective fairness" test for processing vari-
ance applications. The proposed procedures and standards would ac-
celerate the variance process, curtail the costs of the Rules, and yet
provide an effective, though diminished, level of protection against
fiduciary abuse.
I. ERISA's Regulation of Fiduciary Abuse:
Prohibited Transactions Rules
Because substantial capital funds held in private pension plans are
essential sources of individual retirement security,T fiduciary regu-
lation is necessary. ERISA's disclosure requirements and fiduciary stan-
dards are beneficial in policing insider misconduct. But the Rules im-
pose costs not justified by the extra protection afforded.
5. See pp. 767-69 & notes 38-50 infra.
6. See ERISA § 408(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(a) (Supp. V 1975). An administrative exemption
or variance may exempt a transaction, proscribed under id. § 406, 29 U.S. § 1106 (Supp.
V 1975), from the prohibitions of the Rules. A variance can only be granted after applica-
tion to, and approval by, both the Secretary of Labor and the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. All prohibited transactions exemption applications are available for public in-
spection at the Public Documents Room of Pension and Welfare Benefits Programs, Room
N-4677, U.S. Dep't of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. Several
of the applications and accompanying agency responses are discussed in this Note. These
applications will be cited with their initial filing date as follows: "Application No. C-777,
Mar. 13, 1975." Prohibited Transactions Exemptions granted by the agencies will be cited,
for example, as "PTE 78-3," with appropriate citation to the location in the Federal
Register at which they appear.
Other exemptions include transitional rules, ERISA § 414, 29 U.S.C. § 1114 (Supp. V
1975), and statutory exemptions, id. § 408(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b) (Supp. V 1975). Transi-
tional rules exempt otherwise prohibited transactions for an interim period, and statutory
exemptions include those transactions falling within their narrow and specific terms and
conditions.
7. E. ALLEN, J. MELONE & J. ROSENBLOOI, PENSION PLANNING 2, 7 (3d ed. 1976) ("prob-
lem of economic security ... is a serious and increasingly important problem"; assets of
private pensions currently $180 billion and growing at average rate of $14 billion a year).
See p. 760 & note 2 supra.
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A. Background: Need for Federal Regulation
of Pension Fiduciaries
Private pension plans generally are sponsored-that is, established
and funded-by unions or employers for the benefit of employees.8 In
certain cases the management of plan assets may be affected by a sym-
biotic relationship between the pension plan and its sponsors., Al-
though such a relationship may benefit both the plan and its sponsors,10
union or employer control over plan management and investment
creates conflicts of interest and opportunities for abuse. One major
conflict-of-interest situation is the temptation to invest part of the
plan's assets in the sponsor's own stock or other property." Other
potentially abusive situations exist where a sponsor makes an unse-
cured loan to himself or where the sponsor, as trustee, pays himself
an exorbitant salary for occupying a sinecure, such as "financial man-
ager" or "consultant.'
2
Although the need for regulation of such a naturally problematic
area seems obvious, comprehensive federal regulation of pension fi-
duciaries did not exist until the enactment of ERISA in 1974.13 Con-
gress finally acted for two reasons: instances of serious fiduciary abuses
in plan management came to light in the 1960s and early 1970s, and
the legal remedies for such practices proved totally ineffective.'
4
8. See Note, Pension Plans and the Rights of the Retired Worker, 70 CoLur. L. REv.
909, 909 (1970) (pension plans most frequently take form of trust where employer acts as
grantor or creator). For a short description of the basic features and functions associated
with private pension plans, see E. ALLEN, J. MELONE & J. ROSENBLOOM, supra note 7, at
20-65; D. McGILL, supra note 2, at 58-73.
9. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 4869 ("[S]uch an employer will often be an
administrator of his plan, or will function as a trustee or in some other fiduciary capacity
.... [It is recognized that there is a] symbiotic relationship existing between the employer
and the plan covering his employees.")
10. The symbiosis of plans and contributors may directly benefit plans in three ways:
(1) elimination of transactions costs; (2) provision of unique services or goods that are
unavailable in the marketplace; and (3) provision of especially favorable terms that are
sometimes given to a plan by its sponsor. See pp. 767-69 9- notes 38-48 infra.
11. J. BROOKS, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: CORPORATE PENSION FUND ASSET MANAGEMENT 13
(1975).
12. See Private Welfare and Pension Plan Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 1045, H.R.
1046 & H.R. 16462 Before the House General Subcomm. on Labor, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d
Sess. 470-72 (1969-70) (appendix to statement of George Shultz, Sec'y of Labor) [hereinafter
cited as House Hearings].
13. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 4840 (prior to ERISA, private pension plans con-
stituted "the only large private accumulation of funds which have escaped the imprimatur
of effective federal regulation"); D. McGiLL, supra note 2, at 29 (assets of private pension
plans subject to only peripheral regulation prior to 1974).
14. See S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4892 (cases discovered of "extreme misuse of pension funds"; instances
where funds not managed for best interests of covered employees); SENATE REPORT, supra
note 2, at 4840-42 (describing deficiencies in federal laws designed to regulate fiduciary
responsibility).
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The most blatant of the pension fund scandals that focused con-
gressional attention on the need for reform involved the Teamsters'
Pension Fund. Investigations in 1969 revealed that Fund managers had
channeled millions of dollars into loans, usually unsecured and at no
interest, to support suspicious operations and "Mob cronies" of Team-
ster officials. 15 These revelations stimulated interest in legislation that
had been introduced in 1967 to effect "[a] major overhaul of laws
governing private pension plans which would prevent abuses such as
'conflicts of interest, kickbacks and payroll padding.' "10 Further scan-
dals were uncovered in 1971: the United Mine Workers' Welfare and
Retirement Fund had been defrauded of millions of dollars deposited
in a union-controlled bank at no interest,'7 and the Penn Central's
Fund held a million dollars in the Railroad's valueless stock.' 8 Other,
less dramatic, abuses came to light in the congressional hearings on
pension reform: exorbitant fees charged funds by trustees and ad-
ministrators, excessive bank deposits, stock manipulations, imprudent
investment, excessive administrative costs, bribery, and embezzlement.' 9
By passing ERISA, Congress sought to prevent recurrence of such fi-
duciary abuses. Although Congress recognized that "the magnitude
of these improper practices is small in relation to the total number of
plans in existence," it nonetheless concluded that "the seriousness of
the improper practices disclosed indicates the need for additional pre-
cautions to insure that these specific examples do not become general
conditions."
20
Prior to ERISA, two federal statutes required disclosure of pension
15. House Hearings, supra note 12, at 120-472 (describing gross mismanagement of 5628
million Teamsters' Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund).
16. Id. at 142 (bill introduced by Sen. Javits, which addresses problems of vesting
and fiduciary abuse). The pension reform movement that culminated in the passage
of ERISA began in March 1962, when President Kennedy appointed a Cabinet Com-
mittee on Corporate Pension Funds to conduct an investigation and assessment of laws
that governed private pension and other employee retirement income programs. This
Committee reported its finding to President Johnson on January 15, 1965. See PUBLIC
POLICY AND PRIVATE PENSION PROGRAMs: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON PRIVATE EMPLOYEE
RETIREMENT PLANS (1965).
17. J. BROOKS, supra note 11, at 5. Cf. Blankenship v. Boyle, 329 F. Supp. 1089 (D.D.C.
1971) (breaches of trust whereby trustees of United Mine Workers' Welfare and Retire-
ment Fund engaged in widespread mismanagement, placed themselves in situations where
their loyalties conflicted, and fraudulently manipulated funds through union-controlled
bank).
18. J. BRooKs, supra note 11, at 6.
19. See generally House Hearings, supra note 12, at 470-72 (appendix to statement of
George Shultz, Sec'y of Labor) (examples of stock manipulations, exorbitant fees charged
by plan trustees, and excessive bank deposits).
20. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4651 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT, with page citation to [1974]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws].
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 87: 760, 1978
plan information to the Department of Labor.21 It was expected that
this information would enable plan beneficiaries to police fiduciary
abuse by bringing civil suits; participants failed to sue, however, in
part because they found it difficult to obtain information relating to
their plans.2 2 Moreover, Congress learned that "an average plan par-
ticipant, even where he has been furnished an explanation of his plan
provisions, often cannot comprehend them because of the technicali-
ties and complexities of the language used. ' 23 When beneficiaries did
bring suits, they were forced to rely on the common law of trusts,
since the federal statutes contained no substantive standards of con-
duct.24 These suits were generally unsuccessful, primarily because of
judicial deference to exculpatory clauses in trust indentures.25 The
other regulatory scheme available against fiduciary misconduct-the In-
21. Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958 (WPPDA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-309
(1970) (repealed in 1975 by ERISA § ll1(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1031(a)(l) (Supp. V 1975)) (re-
quiring fiduciary to prepare and file description and annual report of plan); Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. § 432 (1970)
(requiring union officials and all others who came into contact with union plan to file
report disclosing six conflict of interest situations).
For a complete description of pre-ERISA federal laws affecting the administration of
private pension plans, see INTERIM REPORT OF THE PRIVATE WELFARE AND PENSION PLAN
STUDY, S. REP. No. 634, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971). For an analysis of both federal and
state regulations, see B. AARON, LEGAL STATUS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RIGHTS UNDER PRIVATE
PENSION PLANS 90-117 (1961); E. PATrERSON, LEGAL PROTECTION OF PRIVATE PENSION Ex-
PECTATIONS 85-113, 188-215 (1960).
22. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 20, at 4642 (experience demonstrated inadequacy of
WPPDA; weaknesses were its limited disclosure requirements and reliance on initiative
of participants to police management of plan); cf. Landau, Merholtz & Perkins, Protecting
a Potential Pensioner's Pension-An Overview Of Present And Proposed Law On Trustees'
Fiduciary Obligations and Vesting, 40 BROOKLYN L. REV. 521, 547 (1974) (problem with
WPPDA was it "relie[d] on the individual employees and beneficiaries, through their
perusal of annual reports, to compel the trustees and administrators to comply with the
Act's provisions," which failed as enforcement method "because of the self-defeating com-
plexity of annual reports and other relevant data").
23. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 4847.
24. HousE REPORT, supra note 20, at 4642 (WPPDA was "wholly lacking in substantive
fiduciary standards"); Note, supra note 3, at 1110 (LMRDA imposes fiduciary duties on
union officials, but offers "no protection to most pension plan beneficiaries").
Traditional trust law imposes upon fiduciaries a duty of individual loyalty that prohibits
various forms of self dealing, including the purchase of trust property, use of the trust
property for the trustees' own purposes, and competition with the beneficiary. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 170-188 (1959). See Committee of Trust Administration and
Accounting, The Trustee's Duty of Loyalty, 6 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 528 (1971).
25. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 4865 (courts in applying trust law to employee
benefit plans have allowed settlor to use exculpatory clauses relieving himself from
liability in certain instances even though plan "is quite different from the testamentary
trust both in purpose and in nature"); E. PATrERSON, supra note 21, at 165 ("Exculpatory
clauses are quite commonly inserted in pension-trust agreements of trust companies and
are, of course, equally effective as to individual trustees of pension funds"); Note, Proposed
Amendments to the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, 4 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 267,
278 (1970) (few participants have brought suits and in those instances when they have,
courts have tended to construe provisions strictly).
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temal Revenue Code-was even less useful. The only sanction available
to the Service was to cut off all tax benefits to the plan, a move that un-
fairly penalized plan beneficiaries.
2
0
B. ERISA's Regulation of Pension Fiduciaries
After finding serious abuses in pension plan management and inef-
fective legal controls, Congress sought to provide efficacious regula-
tion through ERISA. The Act dramatically improves the disclosure
provisions of prior federal law. Participants must be provided a sum-
mary of their plan "written in a manner calculated to be understood
by the average plan participant." 27 Moreover, sponsors must file more
detailed accounts of fund investments in annual reports to the De-
partment of Labor.
28
ERISA also establishes stringent standards for fiduciary responsibility
and stiff penalties for their violation, enforceable both by participants
and by the Department of Labor.2 9 The overriding fiduciary rule is the
"prudent expert" standard: each fiduciary must discharge his duties
"with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances
then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and
26. I.R.C. § 401 (permitting deduction by employer for contributions made to qualified
employee trust); id. §§ 401(a), 503(a), (b) (plan "qualified" only if managed for exclusive
benefit of employees and plan did not engage in certain prohibited transactions, includ-
ing loan at unreasonable rate of interest, payment of excessive compensation for personal
services, purchases of property for moie than adequate consideration). See STAFF OF SENATE
COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
ERISA: PUBLIC LAw 93-406, at 1071 (Comm. Print 1976).
The Code might have been an effective regulatory scheme, but the "possible loss to
innocent employees has caused the Service to be reluctant to impose the sanctions." S.
REP. No. 383, supra note 14, at 4978. Cf. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 4841 (Code in-
effective in policing fiduciary misconduct because "its primary functions are designed to
produce revenue and to prevent evasion of tax obligations").
27. ERISA § 102(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
28. Id. § 103, 29 U.S.C. § 1023 (Supp. V 1975).
29. Under the labor provisions, a fiduciary who breaches the fiduciary requirements of
the Act is personally liable for any losses to the plan resulting from the breach and for
restoring to the plan any profits. Other relief, including removal, is available as a court
should deem appropriate. Id. § 409, 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (Supp. V 1975). The Secretary of
Labor may assess a civil penalty against a party-in-interest involved in a prohibited
transaction, and a civil action may be brought by a participant, beneficiary, or the Secre-
tary to enforce the provisions of the Act and for any other appropriate relief. Id. § 502, 29
U.S.C. § 1132 (Supp. V 1975). Criminal penalties of imprisonment of one year and a S5,000
fine may be imposed on any individual willfully violating any provision in Title I. Id.
§ 501, 29 U.S.C. § 1131 (Supp. V 1975). The "fiduciaries" regulated by the labor provisions
embrace a wide range of individuals including officers and directors of a plan, members
of a plan's investment committee, and persons who select these individuals. Id. § 3(21)(A),
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (Supp. V 1975).
Under the tax provisions of the Act (Title II), excise taxes are imposed on those "dis-
qualified persons" guilty of engaging in a prohibited transaction. Id. § 2003(a), I.R.C.
§ 4975(a), (b).
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familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise
of a like character and with like aims."30 In addition to this central
principle, section 404 of the Act further mandates that a fiduciary dis-
charge his duties solely in the interests of the participants and for the
exclusive purpose of providing benefits to the plan.31 Finally, ERISA
proscribes certain classes of transactions between interested parties and
plans;3 2 the understanding of Congress was that these "proscriptions
... represent the most serious type of fiduciary misconduct which in
one way or another has occurred in connection with some welfare or
pension plans."
33
Specifically, the Rules focus on three types of transactions. First, a
fiduciary may not cause a plan to engage in certain transactions with
a "party-in-interest," such as the "lending of money or other exten-
sion of credit."34 The Act defines "party-in-interest" very broadly to
include any administrator, officer, trustee, custodian, counsel, or em-
ployee of a plan, any fiduciary, any person providing services to a plan,
the employer of covered employees, as well as certain relatives of these
individuals.35 Second, a fiduciary may not deal with the assets of the
plan for his own account, act on behalf of an individual whose in-
terests are adverse to the interests of the plan, or receive any compen-
sation for his personal account from any party dealing with the plan.30
Finally, the pension fund may not acquire or possess securities of the
30. Id. § 404(a)(l)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1975). See Williams, The
Prudent Man Rule of the Pension Reform Act of 1974, 31 Bus. LAW. 99 (1975); Note,
Fiduciary Standards and the Prudent Man Rule Under the Employment [sic] Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, 88 HARV. L. REV. 960 (1975). The Act's standard differs from
the traditional "prudent man" rule in assuming expertise in administering and investing
plan assets, thus prompting the label "prudent expert" rule. See Cummings, Purposes and
Scope of Fiduciary Provisions under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, 31 Bus. LAw. 15, 35 (1975).
31. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § l104(a)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1975). Although this "ex-
clusive purpose" rule essentially imposes the traditional duty of loyalty upon a fiduciary,
the principal problem with applying trust law to employee benefit plans has been elim-
inated. Under the Act, any provision relieving a fiduciary of liability is prohibited. Id.
§ 410(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1110(a) (Supp. V 1975).
Another requirement is that the fiduciary diversify the investments of the plan. Id.
§ 404(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1l04(a)(1)(C) (Supp. V 1975). To comply with this rule, a
fiduciary should not invest the whole or an unreasonably large portion of the trust
property in a single security or in various types of securities dependent on the success of
one enterprise or on conditions in one locality. H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
304 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5085 [hereinafter cited as
CONFERENCE REPORT, with page citations to [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws].
32. ERISA §§ 406, 407(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1106, 1107(a) (Supp. V 1975). See note 4 supra.
33. HousE REPORT, supra note 20, at 4651.
34. ERISA § 406(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1975).
35. Id. § 3(14), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14) (Supp. V 1975).
36. Id. § 406(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b) (Supp. V 1975).
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employer or real property leased to the employer except in limited
circumstances.
37
C. Prohibited Transactions Rules: Costs
The main benefit of the Prohibited Transactions Rules is added
protection against fiduciary abuse: if classes of transactions, some of
which are inherently susceptible to abuse, are forbidden, then plans
should incur fewer losses due to insider misconduct. Without an ef-
ficiently functioning exemption mechanism, however, the operation
of the Rules may result in unnecessary costs to plans and their par
ticipants.
The Rules generate direct costs to plans by prohibiting transactions
with interested parties even when plans would benefit. There are at
least three situations in which the proscription of such transactions
may impose costs on plans. First, a plan and a party-in-interest, fre-
quently a contributing employer or union, often maintain a business
relationship that permits the elimination of transactions costs.3 8 Such
relationships were "permitted and were not uncommon" under prior
law but are forbidden by the Rules.3 9 For example, the sponsor or its
agents may be able to provide useful investment or management services
to its pension fund and can conduct business with the plan at low cost.
40
Indeed, where a transaction with a sponsor involves fair market terms,
the plan will benefit to the extent it may incur less transactions costs.
41
37. Id. §§ 406(a)(2), 407(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1106(a)(2), 1107(a) (Supp. V 1975) (plan may
hold employer real property and securities if fair market value of such holdings does not
exceed 10% of fair market value of plan).
38. See Weiss & Voboril, Fiduciary Standards And Investment Responsibility Under the
New Pension Reform Law, 113 TR. & EsT. 800, 858-60 (1974) (detailing six types of transac-
tions that "may be quite favorable to the plan primarily for one reason-that is, by ag-
gressive and creative management the plan trustees have successfully eliminated the
middleman").
39. Id. at 858-59 (among transactions permitted and common under prior law but
prohibited under Rules are: sale of warehouse owned by sponsor to plan for adequate
consideration when warehouse can be easily rented and is sound investment, prohibited
under ERISA § 406(a)(l)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1975); sponsor seeks to ef-
fect loan secured by first mortgage on real property at interest rate of 12% from its re-
tirement plan, prohibited under ERISA § 406(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(B) (Supp. V
1975)).
40. Neal & Bret, ERISA limitations on the performance of "multiple services" by
fiduciaries, 44 J. TAx. 90, 90 (1976), note that "it may be effective cost-wise for plan to
purchase actuarial consulting services, portfolio evaluating services, and trust accounting
and auditing services from one organization." Nevertheless, such arrangements with a
party-in-interest are prohibited under ERISA § 406(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1l06(a)(1)(C)
(Supp. V 1975) (prohibiting "furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the plan
and a party in interest").
41. See Application No. D-457, Apr. 1, 1976. The application involved a request by a
money-purchase plan to sell land to a shareholder and trustee, a "party-in-interest" transac-
767
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 87: 760, 1978
Plans may also benefit when parties-in-interest provide multiple ser-
vices. For example, Congress recognized the desirability of allowing
brokerage houses to provide both investment management and broker-
age services to the same plan.
42
Added costs may also arise in situations where a party-in-interest is in
a unique position to transact with its plan. 40 For instance, a sponsor may
save money for the pension fund by purchasing blocks of stock in
situations in which the plan might be unable to find enough buyers or
in which a large offering would risk depressing the market for the
stock. 44 In other instances, a sponsor may possess specific land or build-
ings needed by the plan.45
tion prohibited under ERISA § 406(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § l106(a)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1975). The
purchase price was set at $56,500, the fair market value as determined by an independent
appraiser. The plan wished to sell to the interested party so as to "avoid paying the ex-
pense of a real estate brokerage commission out of the proceeds of the sale." Nevertheless,
this variance request was denied. Application No. D-609, Sept. 27, 1976 (on file with Yale
Law Journal), requested that a profit-sharing trust be permitted to sell an antique auto-
mobile that it held for investment purposes to a "party-in-interest," a transaction pro-
hibited under ERISA § 406(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(l)(A) (Supp. V 1975). The pur-
chase price of $65,000 was the fair market value as determined by two independent ap-
praisers. Although the proposed transaction would alleviate the "short" cash position of
the plan, allow the plan to realize a significant return on its investment (the automobile
was purchased four years earlier for $40,000), and save the plan the expense of finding
other buyers in a market where buyers are not readily available, the request for a variance
was denied.
42. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 31, at 5089-90 (although brokerage houses gen-
erally would be prohibited from providing both discretionary investment management and
brokerage services to same plan, conferees expected that variances would be granted).
43. Such costs obtain because perfect substitutes are not available in the market-
place. Thus the proscription of a secured loan at the going market rate from a plan to a
party-in-interest may impose costs on the plan to the extent other borrowers are un-
available and funds remain uninvested. See, e.g., Erlenborn, Problems in Pension Plan
Regulation, 27 LAB. L.J. 195, 197 (1976) (Department of Labor and Internal Revenue
Service effectively denied exemption application for loan from plan to party-in-interest;
thus "pension fund must find another borrower while the funds remain uninvested"). Ap-
plication No. D-198, June 23, 1975 (on file with Yale Law Journal), involved a request by
a profit-sharing plan to purchase from the employer loans made by the employer to his
customers, a transaction prohibited under ERISA § 406(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(l)(A)
(Supp. V 1975). This "unique investment opportunity" had been utilized by the plan for
the past 15 years and had shown an average return of 8.75%. Because the plan was not
in the business of making loans and the start-up costs for such an operation were prohibi-
tive, the only means by which the plan could so invest its funds was through this pro-
hibited transaction. Nevertheless, the variance request was denied.
44. See, e.g., 41 Fed. Reg. 29,503 (1976) (notice of pendency of exemption for proposed
sale by Univar Retirement Plan of its holdings of common stock of Univar Corporation,
plan's sponsor, to that corporation). In this transaction, the sponsor offered to repurchase
the plan's entire block of company stock, because sale of the stock in the open market may
have depressed the market price. An exemption was granted for this sale between the plan
and a party-in-interest (prohibited under ERISA § 406(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(A)
(Supp. V 1975)). See PTE 76-6, 41 Fed. Reg. 46,799 (1976).
45. See, e.g., 41 Fed. Reg. 56,412 (1976) (notice of pendency of exemption for proposed
purchase by Iron Workers Apprentice Fund of tract of land owned by sponsoring union).
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Third, the Rules may impose costs on plans by precluding transac-
tions between a contributing employer or union and a plan in which
the sponsor demands something less than marketplace terms.46 Ex-
amples are situations in which plan sponsors give interest-free loans or
other short-term benefits to help plans in emergency situations.47 Plan
sponsors may be willing to engage in such "uneconomic" behavior be-
cause they may consider pension plans to be crucial elements in the
overall compensation of workers or because they may have "sunk costs"
in plans. 43
In addition to imposing costs in these situations, the Rules may harm
plans in another respect. The inflexibility of the Rules and the ex-
pansive definition of "party-in-interest" may disrupt longstanding
business arrangements among contributing employers and unions,
plans, and other financial institutions.49 Such disruptions generate in-
direct costs to plans to the extent that they deter sponsor commitments
to plans.50
The Fund in this case desired to increase its parking facilities, and the only available land
was that owned by the union, which agreed to sell for $24,859; the appraised value was
S28,300. An exemption was granted for this sale (prohibited under ERISA § 406(a)(1)(A),
29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(l)(A) (Supp. V 1975)). See PTE 77-2, 42 Fed. Reg. 13,633 (1977).
46. See Application No. D-247, July 28, 1975 (on file with Yale Law Journal). This
application requested that a bank pension plan be permitted to purchase certain real
estate loans from the sponsoring bank, a transaction prohibited under ERISA § 406(a)(1)(A),
29 U.S.C. § ll06(a)(l)(A) (Supp. V 1975). Transactions identical to the one at issue had
been engaged in by the parties for the past 14 years and had called for sale of only those
loans that were of the highest quality and adequately secured. Further, the bank had
arranged to repurchase any loan that, at any time, became delinquent. Despite the latter
provision, which probably goes beyond the scope of arm's length business dealings, the
variance request was denied.
47. See, e.g., 41 Fed. Reg. 15,481 (1976) (notice of pendency of exemption for proposed
interest-free loan from sponsoring union to the Electrical Workers Union plan). The plan
was unable to make payments on a health insurance policy for its members. The sponsor
was willing to make the loan for an indefinite period, and the terms called for the trustee
to repay only when the plan possessed sufficient liquidity. An exemption was granted for
this loan between a party-in-interest and a plan (prohibited under ERISA § 406(a)(1)(B),
29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(l)(B) (Supp. V 1975)). See PTE 76-5, 41 Fed. Reg. 30,414 (1976).
48. E. ALLEN, J. MELONE & J. ROSENBLOOM, supra note 7, at 12 (employers who do not
have pension plan are at "competitive disadvantage in attracting and holding personnel").
49. See Gerard & Schreiber, ERISA: Prohibitions and Exemptions-Sections 406 and
40S, 21 N.Y.L.F. 385, 386 (1976) (Rules "encompass an extraordinary number of ordinary
and otherwise perfectly proper transactions"); Comment, supra note 3, at 654 ("the broad
range of activities which [the Rules] proscribed would interfere with the most common,
and honest, of business practices"). See also General Oversight on ERISA: Hearing Before
the Subcomn. on Labor Standards of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 14-46 (1976) (examples of 37 types of transactions normally engaged in by
multiemployer plans that are prohibited under Rules) [hereinafter cited as General Over-
sight Hearings].
50. There is evidence that the effoct of ERISA's requirements, including the Prohibited
Transactions Rules, is to "stall 25 years of steady growth" in private pension plans. PEN-
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II. ERISA's Variances: Unsuccessful Palliatives
In enacting the Prohibited Transactions Rules, Congress did not
intend to establish a scheme that regulated fiduciary abuse at any
cost.51 ERISA, therefore, provides that certain transactions are ex-
empted from the operation of the Rules. Although administrative
variances are a central means of exemption, they have not been pro-
cessed in a timely and efficient manner. These exemptions thus have
failed to reduce the costs of the Rules. As a consequence, legislation
that would repeal the party-in-interest provisions of the Rules has been
proposed in Congress.
5 2
A. The Provisions for Exemption
The Act provides for three types of exemptions: transitional rules,
class exemptions articulated in the statute (statutory exemptions), and
administrative exemptions or variances.5 3 The transitional rules and
the statutory exemptions, because they apply, respectively, for only
limited periods and to specific types of transactions, are of limited
significance in mitigating the costs of the Rules.54 The administrative
SION WORLD, Mar. 1977, at 38 (Act's requirements prompted cancellation of 7,600 private
pension plans in 1976 and brought 50% drop in number of new plans approved by In-
ternal Revenue Service). The number of plan terminations in 1976 was a 100% increase
over the comparable 1975 figure. PENSION WORLD, Aug. 1976, at 3-4 (summarizing state-
ment of Rep. Vanik, Chairman of House Subcommittee charged with ERISA oversight). A
recent survey of pension plan actuaries revealed that a contributing factor in the increase
in the number of plan terminatons is the cost of the Act's fiduciary responsibility require-
ments. PENSION WORL, Jan. 1977, at 61.
The reason for this detrimental effect upon plan particiants is the "voluntary" nature
of pension commitments by sponsors. If the cost of restructuring business relationships is
high, sponsors may simply stop contributing to plans. See Joint Oversight Hearing on the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Labor Standards of the House Comm. on Education and Labor and the Subcomm. on Over-
sight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975) (careful and
creative efforts must be made to accomplish objectives of pension reform while encouraging
growth of both small and large plans) [hereinafter cited as Joint Oversight Hearing];
Comment, supra note 3, at 555 (describing "dilemma" of voluntary pension system: "[a]s
long as the private system remains voluntary in nature, the level of retirement income
security provided will depend upon the willingness of employers to create plans").
51. See S. REP. No. 383, supra note 14, at 4904 (committee has sought to adopt provi-
sions that strike balance between providing meaningful reform and keeping costs within
reasonable limits).
52. SUBCOMM. ON LABOR STANDARDS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR,
AMENDMENT TO THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACr OF 1974, H.R. REP. No.
646, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (description of H.R. 7597, which would have repealed
party-in-interest provisions of Rules and narrowed definition of "fiduciary") [hereinafter
cited as HousE AMENDMENT REPORT].
53. See note 6 supra.
54. The transitional rules were designed to prevent undue hardship to those affiliated
with employee benefit plans who engaged in activities that were to be proscribed under
ERISA but did not violate previously existing law. ERISA § 414, 29 U.S.C. § 1114 (Supp.
V 1975). The statutory exemptions cover nine classes of transactiobs that would otherwise
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variances were instituted to ensure flexibility in the operation of the
Prohibited Transactions Rules.
Section 408 of the Act details the decisional standards that are to be
applied by the two agencies charged with the administration of the
variances, the Department of Labor and the Internal Revenue Service.
The agencies may not grant a variance unless it is determined that such
exemption is "(1) administratively feasible, (2) in the interests of the
plan and of its participants and beneficiaries, and (3) protective of the
rights of participants and beneficiaries of such plan." 55
The procedures involved in the disposition of a variance request are
lengthy and complex,o despite the congressional directive that the
agencies coordinate policies and procedures in processing exemption
applications.57 The administrative variance process is initiated by an
interested party who normally files with the Internal Revenue Service
and the Department of Labor an application that details all relevant
information. 58 The application is first reviewed by supervisory per-
sonnel from each agency who jointly assign primary and secondary
agency responsibility.50 The application is next analyzed by a "case
initiator"60 in the primary agency. The initiator assesses whether the
exemption is "protective of the rights" of plan participants by de-
termining whether the terms of the transaction are "adequate" or
"reasonable."' He also considers whether the exemption is "in the
fall within the Rules. Among these are the provision by a party-in-interest of office space
and services necessary to the establishment or operation of the plan, and the provision in
certain circumstances of ancillary services by a bank or other financial institution when
such party is a fiduciary. Id. § 408(b)(2), (6), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(2), (6) (Supp. V 1975).
Under the statutory exemptions, the fiduciary need determine only that the proposed
transaction fulfills the terms and conditions of one of the narrowly defined categories. For
an example of the narrowness of the scope of the statutory exemptions, see the detailed
conditions prescribed in the "participant loan" exemption, id. § 408(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1108
(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
55. Id. § 408(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(a) (Supp. V 1975) (before granting exemption, Sec'y
of Labor shall publish notice in Federal Register, give adequate notice to interested per-
sons, and afford opportunity for presentation of views).
56. See Internal Revenue Service/Department of Labor-Memorandum of Understand-
ing, [1976] 3 PENSION & PROFIT SHARING (P-H) ff 120,090 (description of interagency pro-
cedures involved in processing exemption applications) [hereinafter cited as Memo of
Understanding].
57. ERISA §§ 408(a), 3003, 3004, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1108(a), 1203, 1204 (Supp. V 1975).
58. See ERISA Procedure 75-1, 40 Fed. Reg. 18,471 (1975) (detailing information to be
submitted with application for exemption, including description of transaction and
fiduciary, description of hardship or economic loss that would result to interested party,
plan, and participants if exemption denied, explanation of fulfillment of statutory criteria,
and statement whether notice of termination has been filed).
59. Memo of Understanding, supra note 56.
60. Id. (within Dep't of Labor: Case Employee Benefit Plan Specialist).
61. Interview of Case Employee Benefit Plan Specialist, Division of Exemptions, Vari-
ances and Determinations, Dep't of Labor. Nov. 28, 1977 (notes on file with Yale Law
Journal) [hereinafter cited as Case Analyst Interview].
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interests of the plan and of its participants" by making a determination
of the necessity of the transaction, the availability of substitute transac-
tions, and other factors indicating the "economic loss" that might be
suffered by the plan.
62
After the primary agency makes its decision, the secondary agency
begins its review of the application and, after a separate examination
of the facts, may accept or reject the prior determination. If the agency
having secondary authority agrees that the statutory criteria have been
met,63 notice is published in the Federal Register that an exemption is
being considered. After notice, and review of all comments and testi-
mony at any hearings, the primary agency determines whether to grant
a variance.
64
B. Operation and Effect of ERISA's Administrative Exemptions
ERISA's variance process has not operated satisfactorily. Although
825 requests for variances have been filed, only fifty-five have been
granted, eighteen have been finally denied, and seventy-eight have
effectively been denied by the agencies' requesting further information
that the parties have been unwilling or unable to supply. 65 Thus only
eighteen percent of variance applications to date have been disposed
of by the agencies. More significantly, decisions on applications are not
made for more than a year after filing: the average time lapse between
the initial application date and the granting of a variance is fifteen
months, and the comparable figure for those applications finally denied
is fourteen months. 66
62. Id. See also ERISA Procedure 75-1, supra note 58.
63. Memo of Understanding, supra note 56.
64. Id. See ERISA § 408(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(a) (Supp. V 1975).
65. Case Analyst Interview, supra note 61 (figures apply to period ending Nov. 28,
1977). This information is available at the Public Documents Room of Pension and Wel-
fare Benefit Programs, Room N-4677, U.S. Dep't of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue, N.W.,
Washington, D.C.
66. The time lapse for all variances granted as of November 28, 1977, is as follows
(where class exemptions involve more than one application, time lapse is based on first
application filed, which is listed first in parentheticals below): PTE (class) 75-1, 40 Fed.
Reg. 50,845 (1975) (Application No. n.a.; 11 months); PTE (class) 76-1, 41 Fed. Reg.
12,740 (1976) (Application No. n.a.; 15 months); PTE 76-2, 41 Fed. Reg. 16,642 (1976)
(Application No. n.a; 11 months); PTE 76-3, 41 Fed. Reg. 26,291 (1976) (Application No.
L-308; 9 months); PTE 76-4, 41 Fed. Reg. 29,502 (1976) (Application No. L-313; 9 months);
PTE 76-5, 41 Fed. Reg. 30,414 (1976) (Application No. L-262; 12 months); PTE 76-6, 41
Fed. Reg. 46,799 (1976) (Application No. D-237; 15 months); PTE 76-7, 41 Fed. Reg. 48,200
(1976) (Application No. D-417; 8 months); PTE 76-8, 41 Fed. Reg. 50,518 (1976) (Applica-
tion No. L-307; 25 months); PTE 76-9, 41 Fed. Reg. 53,219 (1976) (Application No. D-158;
13 months); PTE 76-10, 41 Fed. Reg. 54,080 (1976) (Application No. D-333; 12 months);
PTE 76-11, 41 Fed. Reg. 54,037 (1976) (Application No. L-502; 8 months); PTE 77-1, 42
Fed. Reg. 13,633 (1977) (Application No. L-406; 14 months); PTE 77-2, 42 Fed. Reg.
13,633 (1977) (Application No. L-341; 12 months); PTE (class) 77-3,42 Fed. Reg. 18,734 (1977)
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The effect of this long delay in agency action is that, even if a variance
is granted, it may come too late to be of any value. Many variance re-
quests involve short-range transactions, such as temporary leases and
short-term loans. 7 An example is the case of a union plan that desired
to borrow money from the union in order to meet the monthly pre-
mium payments to its health insurance carrier for the period between
August 1975 and May 1976.8 The plan filed a variance application in
August 1975, but the exemption was not granted until July 1976.69
Delays in agency action result not only in the effective denial of
some variance requests but, even more importantly, may prevent the
filing of many other deserving applications.70 Small plans are probably
deterred from seeking variances at all; their short-range transactions
might not be worth the year's wait. Furthermore, larger transactions
involving more substantial plans may be stifled because such deals often
depend on quick action. For example, in a recent financing deal, the
pension fund of a large corporation had the opportunity to under-
write a line of credit offered by a bank to the corporation.7 1 Although
(Application No. D-025; 23 months); PTE (class) 77-4, 42 Fed. Reg. 18,732 (1977) (Applica-
tion No. D-055; 24 months); PTE 77-5, 42 Fed. Reg. 22,057 (1977) (Application Nos. D-150,
381; 16 months); PTE 77-6, 42 Fed. Reg. 23,217 (1977) (Application No. L-317; 18 months);
PTE (class) 77-7, 42 Fed. Reg. 31,575 (1977) (Application Nos. D-157, 167, 179, 212, 219,
254, 281, 285, 286, 337, 338, 357, 388, 398, 403, 413, 425, 429, 438, 514, 518, 540, 552, 564,
565, 588, 589, 591; 21 months); PTE (class) 77-8, 42 Fed. Reg. 31,574 (1977) (Application
Nos. same as in PTE 77-7; 21 months); PTE (class) 77-9, 42 Fed. Reg. 32,395 (1977) (Ap-
plication Nos. D-183, 301, 419, 459, 466, 573; 24 months); PTE (class) 77-10, 42 Fed. Reg.
33,918 (1977) (Application No. L-562; 8 months); PTE 77-11, 42 Fed. Reg. 45,425 (1977)
(Application No. D-850; 14 months).
The time lapse for all final denials issued as of November 28, 1977, is as follows: Ap-
plication Nos. D-032 (23 months); D-160 (18 months); D-166 (18 months); D-184 (17
months); D-190 (20 months); D-198 (17 months); D-247 (15 months); D-257 (15 months);
D-273 (14 months); D-348 (13 months); D-369 (18 months); D-387 (11 months); D-457 (12
months); D-465 (6 months); D-497 (9 months); D-609 (8 months); D-695 (8 months); L-275
(15 months).
67. See 41 Fed. Reg. 55,245 (1976) (notice of pendency of exemption for plan that desired
to lease equipment on short-term basis from contributing employer; plan not sufficiently
capitalized to purchase equipment and no other short-term lease available); id. at 15,481
(notice of pendency of exemption for plan to get short-term loan from sponsoring union
to pay health insurance premiums).
68. General Oversight Hearings, supra note 49, at 48.
69. PTE 76-5, 41 Fed. Reg. 30,414 (1976).
70. The Rules interfere with short-term business arrangements. See note 67 supra. The
realities of the business world preclude parties from waiting a year for a determination
as to whether a particular transaction is permitted. For example, the six classes of pro-
hibited transactions described in Weiss & Voboril, supra note 38, in most cases could not
be carried out if the parties were required to wait a year or more for the imprimatur of a
governmental agency. One might infer that many meritorious variance applications are
never filed, because there is an inherent conflict between the businessman's need for
prompt action and the agencies' lengthy decisional process.
71. Interview with New York pension lawyer. Nov. 4, 1977 (notes on file with Yale
Law Journal).
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the interest rate was higher than that available from investments of
comparable risk and the plan's trustee could withdraw the plan's funds
at any time, the plan could not take advantage of this profitable in-
vestment opportunity because it was a prohibited transaction. Counsel
advised against applying for a variance, since the money was needed
quickly and variance procedures took too long. Indeed, the general
policy of counsel, a major New York law firm, is to forgo or restructure
a transaction rather than to apply for a variance.
7 2
The agencies' inability to process variance applications in a timely
manner has prompted the House subcommittee charged with oversight
of ERISA73 to express concern that "the administrative burden on the
agency may well exceed its capabilities, if it seeks to effect the con-
gressional intent and exempt those innocent transactions. 7 4 This dis-
satisfaction, together with the poor record of the agencies in processing
variance requests, indicates the need for re-evaluation of current deci-
sionmaking. At present, there are two main reasons for agency delay:
an overprotective, complex standard for granting variances and lengthy,
duplicative procedures.
1. An Overprotective and Complex Standard
The Act provides that the agencies exempt "innocent transactions" 75
that are "protective of the rights" and "in the interests" of plan
participants. 70 Application of this standard contributes to delays be-
cause it requires an extensive and complex evidentiary examination.
77
72. Id. An interview with a second New York pension lawyer (Nov. 4, 1977) revealed
another example of a deserving variance application that was never filed (notes on file
with Yale Law Journal). In this case, the Rules prevented the typical structuring of
a lease financing in which a corporation sets up a "dummy" company to borrow money
to finance a project. In the past, the corporation's investment banker would own the
"dummy," but this arrangement was prohibited under the Rules. As a result, the corpora-
tion was forced to pay a disinterested third party to own the "dummy" even though there
was no danger or possibility of abuse in such ownership. A variance application was not
filed because of the "inordinate length" of the response time.
73. See HousE AMENDMENT REPORT, supra note 52, at 1 (Subcomm. on Labor Standards
of the House Comm. on Education and Labor).
74. Id. at 6.
75. "Innocent transactions" are those where adequate safeguards against fiduciary abuse
are present. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 31, at 5089-90.
76. See ERISA § 408(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(a) (Supp. V 1975). The third criterion, that
the variance be "administratively feasible," see p. 771 supra, appears to have no con-
tent; not a single grant or denial of a variance request was at all affected by this mean-
ingless phrase. See Applications, supra note 66.
77. For example, see PTE 76-7, 41 Fed. Reg. 48,200 (1976), and notice of this exemp-
tion, 41 Fed. Reg. 20,455 (1976) (involving five-year-old loan agreement between plan and
sponsoring corporation complicated by sale of assets of sponsor to another corporation;
sponsor renewed loan by giving security interest in property to plan; plan then attempted
774
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Congress suggested that the agencies investigate "the nature and pur-
pose of the plan, and the indispensability of the proscribed transaction to
effectively carrying out the purposes of the plan, [and] the extent to
which participants under the plan possess alternative methods of in-
vesting or managing their accounts." 78s In practice, determination of
whether the variance will be "in the interests" of plan participants
often results in agency consideration of a great volume of intricate
market and financial information, including whether substitutes are
available in the market and whether the party-in-interest and the plan
will suffer "economic loss" if the exemption is denied. 79
The vagueness of the statutory criteria, moreover, compounds the
problem of delay unnecessarily. The Act establishes the three criteria
as guides for decisionmaking, but offers no definition of them. The
criteria are not self-defining and, indeed, seem to overlap in meaning;
yet the agencies have neither elaborated nor followed any guidelines,
except to indicate that an application must comply with the "statutory
criteria."80 In practice, most crucial is the "in the interests" criterion,
which often requires the balancing of conflicting factors81 in a wholly
undefined way. This has engendered uncertainty and may lead to
arbitrary results.8 2 Moreover, it is not clear that the information re-
to enjoin sale of sponsor's assets); PTE 77-5, 42 Fed. Reg. 22,057 (1977), and notice of this
exemption, 41 Fed. Reg. 55,664 (1976) (exchange of assets between plan and interested
parties; incomprehensible fact situation covers several pages of Federal Register).
78. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 4869.
79. See ERISA Procedure 75-1, supra note 58.
80. See application files on grants and denials of variances, supra note 66; Case Analyst
Interview, supra note 61.
81. The variance decisional process involves a consideration of the "economic loss" or
"hardship" to the party-in-interest, usually the plan sponsor, seeking a variance and of
whether a notice of termination has been filed with the Pension Benefit Guarantee
Corporation. ERISA Procedure 75-1, supra note 58; Case Analyst Interview, supra note
61. Consideration of these factors is not directly relevant to whether a variance is "protec-
tive of the rights" and "in the interests" of plan participants but, rather, affects partici-
pants only to the extent that costs to the sponsor deter his commitment to the plan. See
p. 769 & note 50. That these decisions might require a balancing of direct and indirect
costs to plans was acknowledged by Congress. Joint Oversight Hearings, supra note 50, at
2 (effort must be made to "balance these competing concerns"-objectives of pension re-
form and encouragement of growth and continuation of both small and large employee
benefit plans).
82. Interview, supra note 71 (at present, it is impossible to predict accurately the out-
come of any Department decision on a variance request). The need for specific, meaning-
ful standards to control agency discretion is recognized. See K. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY
JUSTICE 55 (1969) ("When legislative bodies delegate discretionary power without mean-
ingful standards, administrators should develop standards at the earliest feasible time
The arbitrariness of current agency action is illustrated by the different outcomes on
two similar variance applications. Application No. D-465, Apr. 6, 1976, was filed by a
plan that wished to purchase and lease equipment to the employer. The employer pro-
posed to maintain a compensating balance, and the plan was to receive an annual return
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quired to satisfy the "in the interests" standard is always useful. To be
sure, the detailed factual investigation required by this standard will
detect latent opportunities for abuse; but, on balance, such investiga-
tion probably defeats or delays many worthy applications.
2. Lengthy and Duplicative Procedures
The delays that inhere in determining whether a transaction is "in
the interests" of plan participants are exacerbated by the complicated
process of disposing of variance applications. In particular, the dual
jurisdiction of the Labor Department and the IRS-placing "joint and
co-equal authority in two cabinet agencies with differing institutional
perspectives, expertise, and responsibilities"83-results in duplicative
procedures. An initial time lag occurs when the agencies determine
primary and secondary responsibility for individual applications. After
the agency with primary responsibility has made its investigation and
reached a tentative decision, the secondary agency undertakes a sep-
arate investigation and reaches an independent decision. 4 If the two
agencies agree to grant a variance, notice, comment, and possibly a
hearing follow. Where the Rules' self-dealing provisions are involved,
a hearing is required and no doubt produces several months' delay.85
III. Toward Workable Administrative Exemptions
Congress has expressed dissatisfaction with the operation of the ad-
ministrative variances, and reforms have been proposed. One such
proposal calls for the creation of a single federal agency that would
have sole responsibility for the administration of all provisions of the
Act.86 Although a single agency would eliminate the.current problem
of dual jurisdiction, the proposal does not address the more important
in excess of 10%. Further, the lease would only be submitted to the plan if the terms were
accepted by two independent leasing firms. This request for a variance was denied; the
Department of Labor claimed that there was "no showing made that the Plan will receive
a return on its investment greater than could be provided on investments with parties in-
dependent of the Employer." Nevertheless, in Application No. D-161, see [1976] 3 PENSION
& PROFIT SHARING (P-H) f 135,356, the Department has proposed that a variance be
granted for a similar "leaseback" arrangement between a plan and an employer where no
showing was made that the terms of the transaction were "greater" than could be ob-
tained from a disinterested party.
83. [1976] 1 PENSION & PROFIT SHARING (P-H) f 4.10 (quoting testimony of former Labor
Department Administrator William Chadwick).
84. See Memo of Understanding, supra note 56.
85. ERISA § 408(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(a) (Supp. V 1975). The scheduling, notice, and
processing involved in a full evidentiary hearing adds several months to the variance re-
view process.
86. H.R. 4340, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 123 CONC. REc. H1661 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1977)
(Rep. Dent) (H.R. 4340 would merge administrative and enforcement functions of IRS and
Dep't of Labor into single "Employee Benefits Administration").
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issue-the lack of an easy-to-administer standard. Another proposal calls
for the repeal of the party-in-interest sections of the Prohibited Transac-
tions Rules. 7 This change would sacrifice the advantages of prophy-
lactic protections against fiduciary abuse and would perpetuate the
basic deficiencies in the variance procedures of the self-dealing provi-
sions of the Rules. 8 Although these suggested reforms are inadequate,
they do point to the two main avenues for constructive change: nar-
rowing the reach of the Rules and streamlining procedures in order
to minimize delay and other costs incurred by plans seeking variances.
A. Establishing an "Objective Fairness" Standard
The reform most essential for expediting the variance process is the
establishment of a decisional standard that is easy to apply and con-
sistent with the other fiduciary standards of the Act. This Note sug-
gests an "objective fairness" test, whereby a variance would be granted
whenever the applicant demonstrates that the terms of the transaction,
from the perspective of the plan, are at least as favorable as the terms
that would be reached by parties in an "arm's length" bargain. This
test is derived from the standards for fiduciary conduct found in
ERISA and the common law. Section 404's mandate that the fiduciary
act as a prudent financial expert for the exclusive purpose of bene-
fiting the plan is consonant with the proposed test.89 Furthermore, the
statutory exemptions and the transitional rules recognize that certain
prohibited transactions should be allowed if the plan receives at least
marketplace terms.90 A standard analogous to this objective fairness
criterion governs general corporate law cases: an adequate defense for
corporate fiduciaries in a position of conflict of interest has always been
that the deal was arrived at by arm's length bargaining and reflects fair
consideration. 91
87. See HOUSE AMENDMENT REPORT, supra note 52, at 4-6, 28-29 (report on H.R. 7597
calling for repeal of party-in-interest provisions of Prohibited Transactions Rules).
88. But see Gerard & Schreiber, supra note 49, at 389 (H.R. 7597 would remedy many
problems and reduce need for cumbersome administrative action).
89. ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (Supp. V 1975). The test would only allow transac-
tions that involve fair market values and other "arm's length" terms; that is, the test
would only allow behavior expected of a "prudent man." See pp. 765-66 & note 30 supra.
90. ERISA § 414(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1114(c)(3) (Supp. V 1975) (Rules shall not apply until
1984 to any sale or other disposition of property between plan and party-in-interest if
amount received by plan is "not less than fair market value"); id. § 408(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1108
(b) (Supp. V 1975) (each statutory exemption contains requirement that plan receive rea-
sonable interest rate, adequate consideration, or like).
91. See W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 565-66 (4th ed. 1969) (majority
of jurisdictions now holds that transaction involving interested director is voidable only
if "unfair ... or if the directors acted in bad faith").
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1. Ease of Application
The proposed standard would substantially expedite decisionmaking
by requiring a less complex factual inquiry than that currently under-
taken. Under the present statutory criteria, in determining whether
the variance will be "protective of the rights" of plan participants, the
agencies consider objective evidence of the marketplace fairness of the
transaction. This often involves an appraisal by independent experts
and presentation of evidence of current market values.92 Such evidence
is usually available to parties seeking variances and, more importantly,
is fairly easy for the agency to check for veracity. The objective fair-
ness test essentially adopts this first level of analyzing variance ap-
plications. The standard goes no further, however, for it merely seeks
to guarantee the basic economic rationality of the transaction.
Hence, under the proposed test, the agencies would not delve into
the additional level of detail that they now examine under the "in the
interests" standard. For example, under the objective fairness test a
loan by the plan to a party-in-interest would be scrutinized only to
determine that the loan is adequately secured and that the interest
rate is reasonable. In contrast, the present standard requires the party
to make an extensive evidentiary showing, including a demonstration
that the terms "are greater than those offered by unrelated third parties
under similar circumstances." 93 This "best terms available" require-
ment places an inordinate burden on the party seeking a variance in-
sofar as it demands that the applicant establish that the plan cannot
obtain better terms somewhere in the marketplace. All that reason-
ably can be expected of a party is for him to present evidence, in the
form of an independent appraisal or the like, that the terms of the
transaction reflect "fair market values." This observation is buttressed
by certain of the transitional rules and class exemptions, which demand
no more than "adequate" or "reasonable" terms, not the "best avail-
able terms."
The advantages of adopting the objective fairness test for deciding
variance applications are considerable. The major advantage of the
test is that it would transform the variance process into a workable
92. See, e.g., PTE 77-1, 42 Fed. Reg. 13,633 (1977); 41 Fed. Reg. 43,976 (1976) (noting
pendency of exemption; appraisers recommended purchase price for tract of land between
$250,000 and $300,000-plan purchase at $250,000 falls within recommended range and is
reasonable); PTE 77-2, 42 Fed. Reg. 13,633 (1977); 41 Fed. Reg. 56,412, 56,413 (1976) (noting
pendency of exemption; land that plan was to purchase from party-in-interest for $24,859
was appraised by independent person at $28,300); PTE 76-4, 41 Fed. Reg. 29,502 (1976);
41 Fed. Reg. 15,482 (1976) (noting pendency of exemption; independent appraisal put fair
market value at $52,500, thus purchase by plan at $45,000 was not abusive).
93. See Application No. D-387, Jan. 12, 1976 (on file with Yale Law Journal).
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safety-valve that would mitigate the costs of the Prohibited Transac-
tions Rules. The test would enable the agencies to process applications
without the time-consuming detailed factual investigation required
by present statutory standards. The investigation would involve a
limited range of information about the market value of the goods or
services at stake in the transaction-information that should be ac-
cessible to investigators. In addition, the proposed standard is a better
defined, more determinate one than the statutory criteria currently
employed. As a result, applicants under the new test would be better
able to gauge the validity of their petitions and to make plans accord-
ingly.
2. Adequate Protection Against Fiduciary Abuse
Besides reducing delays and providing greater clarity, the objective
fairness test would result in the approval of many more applications
than are currently granted without greatly sacrificing the protection af-
forded by the present standard. Of the eighteen variance applications
denied "on the merits, '94 only two would have been denied pursuant
to the proposed testa 5 The test thus would permit more variances in a
shorter time; objection may be raised, however, that it would under-
mine the goals of the Rules by allowing too many abusive transactions.
For example, the proposed standard would permit some loans that
benefit the party-in-interest at the expense of the plan, such as a loan at
the "going rate" when money is tight and when loans are unavailable at
any rate of interest.96 It would also allow an employer who has surplus
inventory to sell it to the plan at a fair price, even if the plan does not
need the goods. On balance, however, the objective fairness test would
94. See Case Analyst Interview, supra note 61.
95. See note 66 supra (list of all 18 denials). The two variance applications that would
have failed the "objective fairness" test are Application No. D-160, June 6, 1975 (on file
with Yale Law Journal), and Application No. L-275, Sept. 9, 1975 (on file with Yale Law
Journal). Both involved unsecured loans from a plan to a party-in-interest. The lack of
adequate security is not commensurate with arm's length bargaining and would have
caused the denial of these requests under the proposed test. In applying the "objective
fairness" standard to several of the other applications, it may have been required that the
parties supply additional information to clarify the arm's length nature of the transaction.
See, e.g., Application No. D-166, May 28, 1975 (on file with Yale Law Journal) (Dep't of
Labor claimed that party-in-interest failed to prove that terms were arm's length).
96. See S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29 (1969), reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2055 (examples of three types of abusive transactions that arm's length
standards often permit: (1) purchase of property from interested party at fair price when
party needs cash and cannot find buyer; (2) loan to interested party with adequate
security at reasonable rate of interest when money market tight and party unable to find
alternate sources of funds; (3) lease from interested party when latter needs advance
leases to secure financing for construction or acquisition of property).
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afford an effective, albeit reduced, level of protection against fiduciary
abuse.
First, the objective fairness test would prevent the vast majority of
transactions that harm pension plans. Indeed, the proposed scheme
retains the major advantage of the Prohibited Transactions Rules: the
plan fiduciary has the evidentiary burden of justifying the transaction
to a federal agency and may not proceed with the transaction, without
risking stiff penalties, until the agency is convinced of the fairness of
the terms. This alone should continue to discourage many abusive
transactions. Moreover, a determination that the terms of a particular
transaction between a plan and party-in-interest are at least as favor-
able to the plan as those arrived at in an arm's length bargain would
prevent the types of abuses that prompted Congress to enact ERISA:
unsecured loans at no interest, purchases of worthless stock, and leases
of worthless equipment. 97 The scandals involving pension funds of
the Mine Workers, Penn Central, and Teamsters would not have met
the objective fairness test.98
In cases where the objective fairness test would not prevent certain
abusive transactions from receiving administrative exemptions, the
Act's other fiduciary responsibility provisions will serve as an effective
second level of protection. Whether or not a variance is granted, the
stringent fiduciary guarantees of section 404, the "prudent expert" and
"exclusive benefit" rules,99 are still applicable to fiduciary conduct. 100
These standards may be enforced against a fiduciary by the Department
of Labor or by private actions.' 0 ' Because the Act's disclosure sections
mandate regular plan reports that are available to participants and be-
cause participants will receive notice of exemption applications, civil
suits may be an effective means of controlling abuse. For example, plan
participants might sue for violation of the exclusive benefit rule when
a fiduciary purchases unnecessary inventory for the plan.
Of the abuses that would not be prevented by the proposed test,
many are also beyond the reach of the existing statutory criteria.
Fiduciaries committing the most fraudulent abuses-bribery and em-
bezzlement-may not apply for variances in the first place. Carefully
97. See House Hearings, supra note 12, at 470-72 (statement of George Shultz, Sec'y of
Labor). The abusive practices detailed by Mr. Shultz would have been prohibited by the
simple requirement that the terms of the transaction be adequate or reasonable.
98. See p. 763 & notes 15-18 supra. Each of these instances of abuse involved transaction
terms that were not commensurate with "arm's length" bargaining.
99. See pp. 765-66 supra.
100. The variance section of the Act provides that any "exemption granted under this
section shall not relieve a fiduciary from any other applicable provision of this Act."
ERISA § 408(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(a) (Supp. V 1975).
101. See p. 765 & note 29 supra.
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concealed fraud, including the surplus inventory situation, may cir-
cumvent both standards. 10 2 Moreover, the objective fairness standard
may enable the Labor Department to rely less on "class exemptions"
and thus to afford better protection against fiduciary abuse in some
situations. Because a class exemption entitles fiduciaries who comply
with its terms and conditions to proceed with a particular prohibited
transaction without applying for a variance,10 3 participants may be left
with a lesser degree of protection, since the advantages of prior review
and the applicants' burden of proof are lost. Nevertheless, the agencies
are placing increasing reliance on class exemption. 10 4 The simplifica-
tion of the process for review of individual variance applications may
result in more widespread use of them; in the long run, this could
provide a more effective means of "protecting the rights" of plan
beneficiaries.
B. Streamlining Procedures
To ensure an expeditious decisional process, implementation of an
objective fairness test should be accompanied by a streamlining of
agency procedures. Congress should give the Department of Labor
primary responsibility for administering variances, which would pre-
vent the duplication of efforts and other problems arising from dual
jurisdiction. The Labor Department is familiar with the special cir-
cumstances and problems surrounding the administration of employee
benefit plans.'10 The role of the Internal Revenue Service should be
limited to giving advice to the Department concerning future policy.
This change would eliminate the need for the existing preliminary
conference designed to determine primary responsibility in individual
cases and the review of the entire application by the secondary agency.
Since approximately one-half of existing procedures would be elimi-
nated, the processing time for applications might be shortened by as
much as fifty percent in some cases.
102. Since the "in the interests" standard involves a more detailed investigation into
the specific facts of the transaction, it is not disputed that this standard is a more effective
deterrent of such fraudulent transactions.
103. See ERISA § 408(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b) (Supp. V 1975); CONFERENCE RroRT, supra
note 31, at 5092-97.
104. In 1976, only one of the 11 administrative variances granted was a class exemption.
In 1977 (as of Nov. 28, 1977), six of the 11 variances granted have been class exemptions.
See note 66 supra. This Note does not argue that class exemptions should never be relied
on in the administrative exemption process. The agencies should recognize, however, that
the class exemption offers a different, and often lesser, degree of protection against
fiduciary abuse.
105. Cf. Senate Report, supra note 2, at 4852-53 (Secretary of Labor should be given
sufficient power to implement provisions of Act; Secretary already has investigatory powers
in enforcing Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act).
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Second, a rigorous timetable should be adopted by the Department
of Labor. The Department's goal should be to decide variance ap-
plications within two months of submission. 10 6 Thus, when a fiduciary
applies for a variance, the agency should immediately give notice to
affected parties and begin factfinding. Further, the present require-
ment for an evidentiary hearing whenever an application involves the
self-dealing prohibitions should be eliminated. The hearing often
delays the application for several months and is rarely useful; indeed,
interested parties sometimes fail to attend hearings under the present-
system. 10 7 Moreover, the submission of comments should in most cases
be sufficient to alert the Department to problematic applications.
The primary advantage of these proposals is their assurance of timely
disposition of variance applications. By eliminating agency duplication
and unnecessary procedures and by establishing a less complex standard
for decisionmaking, the reforms should enable the Department of
Labor to process most requests within two months of application.
Business planning should be facilitated, because interested parties will
be given a fast answer from the Department and should be able to
predict with greater confidence the ultimate decision. Applications for
short-term or emergency needs might no longer be discouraged, and
deserving requests would be granted without costly delays in imple-
mentation. In sum, plan managers would no longer be deterred from
seeking variances by the existing constraints of administrative delay,
unpredictability, and substantive restrictiveness.
As a result of the proposals, plans should benefit financially, at least
in part because they will be better able to take advantage of profitable
opportunities offered by parties-in-interest. The proposed reforms
would ensure expeditious processing of variance applications, and thus
would permit profitable transactions that are protective of the interests
of plan beneficiaries.
106. This goal appears to be reasonable. Indeed, the Department of Labor has had no
problem meeting the 60-day limit on the bringing of suits to overturn union elections
under Title IV of the LMRDA, which involves an even more complex and lengthy in-
vestigation. LMRDA § 402(b), 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1970). See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, UNION
ELECTION CASES UNDER THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DIscLosuRE ACT 1966-1970,
at 4-6 (1970); [1977] 1 LAB. REL. REP. (96 News & Background Info.) 140 (Department of
Labor investigation and decision whether to bring suit to overturn national election of
Mine Workers reached within 60-day limit); cf. Oversight Hearings on the National Labor
Relations Board: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the
House Comm. on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1975) (in 83% of cases
NLRB Regional Director conducts investigation and hearings within 44 days in deciding
whether to hold representation election).
107. See PTE 76-10, 41 Fed. Reg. 54,080 (1976) (only one individual requested hearing
and he failed to attend).
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